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Abstract: With the advent of advanced technology, IoT introduces a vast number of devices connecting 
with each other and collecting a sheer volume of data. Thus, the demands of IoT security is paramount. 
Cryptography is being used to secure the networks for authentication, confidentiality, data integrity and 
access control. However, due to the resource constraint nature of IoT devices, the traditional cryptographic 
protocols may not be suited in all IoT environments. Researchers, as a result, have been proposing various 
lightweight cryptographic algorithms and protocols. In this paper, we discuss the state of the art lightweight 
cryptographic protocols for IoT networks and present a comparative analysis of the existing protocols. In 
doing so, this paper has classified the most current algorithm into two parts, such as symmetric and 
asymmetric lightweight cryptography. Additionally, we consider several recent developed block cipher and 
stream cipher algorithms. Furthermore, various research challenges of lightweight cryptography have been 
addressed. 
Keywords — Lightweight Cryptography, Block cipher, Stream cipher, Elliptic curve cipher, 
Internet of things (IoT), security. 
 
1. Introduction: 
Internet of Things (IoT) is a cluster of physical nodes or objects or devices that communicate with 
each other across the Internet so the user could monitor, analyse, and control them remotely. In the last 
few years, IoT growth exponentially, and it occupies our lives in several areas such as city, agriculture, 
hospital, environment, homes, roads and so on. This expansion of the Internet of things making it the 
forthcoming future of the technology in human history. The IoT object usually equipped with different 
types of sensors and actuators, which collect numerous data and sent the accumulated data through the 
cyberspace for monitoring, analysing, controlling, and reaching various conclusions [1]. Most of these 
data are real-time data and help us to make the correct decision about the different service domains. 
However, this Internet-driven raw data need to be transferred securely and switched to human-
understandable information so we could gather knowledge and use them in various domains such as 
smart city, agriculture, environment, interactive transport, and grid. 
A Smart City is an efficient consumption of city resources cost-effectively for the urban ecosystem, 
which enhances the quality of people life [2]. The smart city provides facilities in a variety of service 
domain such as traffic, energy, environment, medicine, education, and safety. 70% of the services are 
currently provided on the three fields like traffic, safety, and power [3]. Figure 1 shows the leading 
smart city model around the globe. United Nations Population Fund presented more than half of the 
world’s population now resides in the city. By 2050, it is expected to be increased to around 68% [4]. 
Cisco declared one billion dollar investment projects in smart cities in 2017. In China, more than 200 
smart city developments are in progress [5]. However, smart city domains create numerous security and 
privacy challenges due to the weaknesses of each layer of a smart city system. Various attacks can 
reduce the quality of smart city facilities. In 2015, approximately 230 thousand Ukraine residents 
experienced a long period of power interruption as the electricity grid has been hacked by intruders 
hackers [6]. The enormous data that are shared in IoT-enabled environments can be exploited by 
malicious attacks that can be a security challenge of the smart city [7]. Hence, addressing and 
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minimising of these security and privacy risks by the promotion of efficient security solutions is crucial 
for the success of smart city initiatives. 
Ensuring privacy in smart city IoT nodes is challenging for several reasons. Firstly, the CPU in IoT 
devices is minimal and cannot compute complex algorithms [8-12]. Secondly, the power consumption 
of the security algorithm should be low since the majority of IoT devices work with a battery [9, 11-
15]. Thirdly, simple sensors are connected to cover large physical network [14]. Finally, the cost of 
implementing the security algorithm should be little to deploy as many devices as possible [1, 10, 16, 
17]. Conventional cybersecurity cryptography such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), RSA 
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), DES (Data Encryption Standard), blowfish, and RC6 cannot be used 
immediately to these smart domains because of the heterogeneity, scalability, and dynamic features of 
smart cities [15]. RC2 is the algorithm that consumes most power, on the contrary blowfish in the lowest 
one. Besides, most of these algorithms consume more energy while operating. Biswas has compared 
several WSN sensor motes and found that resource-constrained devices have as low as 2 kilobytes (kB) 
and 1 kB of Random Access Memory (RAM) and Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only 
Memory (EEPROM) correspondingly [15]. Such sensors cannot utilise the resource-consuming 
conventional security approaches [18]. Hence, secure communication is one of the significant concerns 
in low power and lossy systems which undoubtedly defines the necessity to develop Lightweight 
Cryptographic (LWC) algorithms for IoT security.  
 
Fig 1: Major service in Smart City Network. 
Despite the growing interest in IoT, the fundamental question is: What lightweight cryptography 
has developed to address the IoT security issues, which must be addressed to develop and execute to 
secure IoT networks efficiently? In an IoT environment, a systematic literature review on lightweight 
cryptography algorithm is essential to secure IoT communication. Hence, this paper focuses on the 
following main research questions: 
1. What lightweight cryptography been has developed to address the IoT security issues?  
2. How can a lightweight cryptography secure IoT structure? 
3. What consequences the findings have on future IoT research? 
This paper addresses the most current state of the art research in the field of lightweight 
cryptography covering the year 2019 and 2020. This paper also presents a comparative analysis of most 
present lightweight algorithms like LCC, LWHC, Modified PRESENT, SAT_Jo etc. Besides, the paper 
evaluates the most recent and existing protocols using a set of matrices such as block size, key length, 
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gate area, technology value, round, latency, and throughput. The comprehensive evaluation 
demonstrates the requirements of lightweight cryptography ciphers. This paper organises into seven 
sections. Section I introduces IoT and the need for the development of LWC in the smart city. The IoT 
architecture and threats present in section II. Section III discusses IoT architecture and devices used 
according to the structure. Section IV describes security mechanisms in the IoT system. The most recent 
lightweight cryptography development in IoT is discussed in section V. Section VI presents the critical 
analysis of lightweight ciphers and the research gaps. Finally, the conclusion presents in section VII. 
2. IoT Architecture and threats 
This section draws the different layer of IoT architecture according to the devices functionality and 
various exposure to various attacks according to the different IoT layers. IoT domains show an 
enormous possibility. However, IoT network connects with heterogeneous devices with mixed OS and 
connect with a different communication protocol such as Wireless, Zigbee and mobile technology 
which creates considerable threats in security and privacy [19]. In this chapter, we draw an outline of 
IoT Architecture and discussion on different layers. Besides, we present various attacks in IoT 
according to the architectural layer. 
IoT architecture contains four distinct critical layers: (i) Perception Layer, (ii) Network Layer, (iii) 
Middleware Layer, and (iv) Application Layer [9]. Table 1 demonstrates the IoT layer with the 
components of each layer and their tasks in details. 
Table 1: IoT layer architecture and task accordingly.  
2.1 Application Layer and Security Attacks 
The application layer is the top layer in the IoT infrastructure. The Middleware layer passes 
information to this layer to process with different Applications. Application layer represents the IoT 
data as a business model, flowchart, and graph.  Smart city, smart home and smart car are some of the 
examples of application layer automation. Some of the application layer attacks are buffer overflow 
attacks [20], Cross-site Scripting attack [20], SQL injection attack [21], denial of service attack [22], 
phishing attacks [23], and data privacy issue [24]. 
 
Layer Component Tasks 
Application Layer Third party application, Consoles, 
Websites, Touch panel. 
Machine Learning, Business 
model, Graphs and Flow charts. 
Middleware Layer Vendor specific third application. Machine Learning, Processing, 
Pre-processing, and real time 
action. 
Network Layer Nodes, Gateways, Firmware.  Transmit and process data, Device 
management, process, secure 
routing. 
Perception Layer Sensors (Temperature and Humidity), 
Actuators (Relays and motor) 
Transfer data, Identity, Monitor, 
Acquisition and Action. 
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2.2 Middleware Layer and Security Attacks 
This Middleware layer operates the vendor-specific services for various IoT node information 
which performs as a link between the Network and Application layer. This link facilitates to process, 
pre-process, and store IoT node information based on the third party and node requirement [20]. An 
intruder can introduce different attacks in the Middleware in a different way such as application security 
attack [20], unauthorised access attack [25], replay attack [21], sleep deprivation attack [22], data 
security attack [26] etc. Middleware and application layer both are using resource-rich devices which 
can use the traditional cryptography to secure the IoT networks. Consequently, these two layers devices 
are not focusing on this paper. Paper mainly discuss the security technique of resource-constrained 
devices of network and perception layers. 
2.3 Network Layer and Security Attacks 
Network layer also called Transit layer which processes and securely routes or transmits the data 
throughout the IoT infrastructure. This layer uses different protocols like Zigbee, Bluetooth, IR, and 
6LowPan for data transmission. For further processing and action, Network Layer depends on the 
Middleware Layer. Following are the different attacks in this layer. 
• Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping is a passive attack and extracts the message contents from 
network broadcastings. It snoops, captures and sniffs broadcasted data then initiate different 
attacks or still different critical information [27].  
• Device Cloning attacks: As IoT devices are easily accessible from the network, an intruder can 
create a clone of the device and can compromise the IoT network infrastructure using these 
devices [27]. 
• Spoofing attacks: Things are connected to the network either directly or through a gateway in 
the IoT structure. An attacker can physically capture the node or gateways and can replace or 
reprogrammed with malicious code. Things and gateways must be authenticated, and the date 
should be encrypted to prevent this kind of attack [28].  
• DDoS attacks: IoT devices are exposed as the IoT architecture usages heterogeneous, and 
resource-constrained nodes. Firstly, an attacker captures the device credentials and gets access 
to the gateways/devices. A hacker uses network information to explore the IoT devices and can 
initiate a DoS attack by sending fake packets and down the entire system [29]. 
• Key Attack: Some devices pre-shared keys are hard-coded within the code. Hence, the intruder 
can easily capture this information [30]. 
• Traffic analysis: Traffic analysis is another passive attack and able to retrieve valuable 
information from the network traffic such as source and destination details from the header of 
the transmitted communications [12].  
• Brute-force attack: This known as an exhaustive search. This is a cryptographic hack which 
depends on predicting possible patterns of a targeted password to discover the correct password 
[31].  
• Man-In-The-Middle attacks: Due to the heterogeneous current IoT architecture, an intruder 
captures communications between two parties to eavesdrop or modify traffic travelling 
between them secretly. Attackers may capture personal information, login credentials or 
disruption communications and corrupt data [32].  
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• Sinkhole attacks: An adversary generates sinkholes to attract traffic flow from all the IoT 
devices. The network traffic can later be rerouted to other devices than the destination gateway. 
This attack compromises the IoT devices privacy and confidentiality [33]. 
2.4 Perception Layer and Security Attacks 
The crucial role of IoT system is to gather and transmit information from the real world. Henceforth, 
the perception layer possesses different kinds of data gathering, processing and transmitting devices 
like pressure sensors, temperature sensors, Bluetooth, ZigBee etc. The perception layer can be split into 
two parts, such as (a) perception node (sensors or controllers, etc.) and (b) perception network that 
communicates to the upper layer of IoT architecture [9]. Perception node like sensors and actuators 
collect and control information. However, perception network transmits the collected information to the 
gateway. Perception layer uses WSN, RFID and GPS technology. 
In the perception layer, the node could be attacked or intruded or compromised physically. 
Generally, this compromised device called faulty nodes. In order to ensure the quality of service, it is 
necessary to detect the defective devices and take action to avoid further degradation of the service. A 
localised fault detection algorithm was delivered to discover the faulty nodes in WSN [9]. Da Silva et 
al. [34] suggested a decentralised intrusion discovery system paradigm for the wireless sensor network. 
Wang et al. [35] proposed the intrusion discovery probability in both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
WSN.  
The cryptography cipher algorithms and key management scheme is used to secure perception layer 
network communication. Device authentication uses a private key algorithm which has greater 
scalability and can ensure the security of the system without complicated key management algorithm 
[36]. Key management involves a secret key generation, distribution, storage, updating, and destruction. 
Key distribution system divided into four categories such as a) key broadcast distribution [37], b) group 
key distribution [38], c) master key pre-distribution; [39] and d) pairwise key distribution [40, 41]. 
Perception layer vulnerable to the following attacks. 
• Physical Damage: Generally, IoT devices are located in public places. Consequently, physical 
nodes could be captured, damaged, or compromised. An intruder can tamper the device and use 
this device to log into the IoT gateway, which they can modify and capture network traffic and 
other secret information [42]. 
• Code Injection attacks: As an intruder can get access to the physical IoT devices, they can 
manipulate the devices by introducing malicious codes into the devices [27].  
• Jamming attacks: This is a widespread attack for perception layer devices. IoT edge devices 
use wireless protocol for network communication to transfer data to a different layer, program 
devices, receive instructions form the upper layer [41]. 
• Battery draining: An intruder objective to drain the IoT device battery. After capturing the 
device, an adversary continuously performs an energy-hungry operation. By doing this, an 
attacker can deteriorate the network by reducing the battery power of resource-constrained IoT 
sensors [43]. 
While there are various attacks as mentioned above, the researchers also suggested several 
mitigation techniques such as cryptography, authentication, securing physical devices etc. However, 
these attacks are still creating serious concern for low resource devices used in the Internet of things 
domains.  
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3. Devices in different IoT layers 
IoT devices are present in all architectural layer which have a limited proficiency due to low 
memory, internal storage, computational capability and power. The IoT environment comprises of 
various service architectures, protocols and network design to deal with billions of IoT nodes to 
exchange information.  IoT devices can be generally divided into three categories like Class 0, Class 1 
and Class 2 [44, 45]. 
Class 0 or low-end IoT devices are with constrained resources like memory, power, and 
computational capability, which are mainly present at the first or perception layer of the IoT 
architecture. These low-end devices sense data and communicate with lightweight communication 
protocols. The RAM varies from 1 to 50 KB, and flash memory ranges from 10 to 50 KB [46]. Security 
is the primary concern in these low-end nodes as there are vulnerable to threats. 
Class 1 or middle-end IoT devices have more resources compared to low-end nodes. These devices 
are basic microcontrollers and sit over low-end devices in IoT architecture to improve the abilities of 
class 0 nodes devices [47]. These devices have a higher clock rate like from 100 MHz to 1.5 GHz, and 
RAM varies from 100 KB to 100 MB. The flash memory varies from 10 KB to 100 MB. These devices 
can use data encryption technology to secure the data. Arduino, Netduino are some of the middle-end 
nodes and they also present at both first and second layer of IoT design [48, 49]. 
Single-board computers with a high number of resources in terms of CPU, RAM, flash memory is 
in Class 2. These devices support traditional operating systems such as LINUX, UNIX [50] and support 
growing technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning, deep learning and neural network. 
These devices have comparatively less security concern due to the higher resources [51]. Table 2 
demonstrates the comparison of communication network technology and interfaces of the different IoT devices 
[46]. 
Table 2: Comparison of IoT devices in terms of communication technology and interfaces. 
Device Interface provided Communication 
Raspberry Pi HDMI, micro USB, USB 2.0, Ethernet, 
WLAN, Blueetooth4.2, CSI camera port, 
DSI display port 
IEEE 802.11b/n/ac wireless LAN, 
Bluetooth 4.2, BLE and Gigabit 
Ethernet 
Beagleboard HDMI, 3.5 mm stereo in/out, I2X, 
UART, LCD 
Ethernet, WLAN, Bluetooth 
Netduino UART, I2C, SPI Ethernet, low power Wi-Fi 
Arduino USB, UART, ADC, I2C Ethernet, IEEE 802.11ah, Wi-Fi 
support 
OpenMote-
CC2538 
I2C, SPI IEEE 802.15.4 with 2.4 GHz band 
TELOSB I2C, SPI IEEE802.15.4 at 250 Kbps rate 
OpenMote-B I2C, SPI, USB 2.0 IEEE802.15.4 g 
LSN50 I2C, ADC, DAC, USART, USB Wireless chip 
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IoT devices have fundamental restrictions such as processing power, storage, memory, power 
consumption and connectivity [52, 53]. Lightweight cryptography needs to consider those limitations 
while designing and implementing an IoT network. The effectiveness of a network depends on design 
complexity, power consumption, throughput, and CMOS technology. 
Design complexity is determined by the gate value (GE). Power intake is crucial for active devices 
like wireless sensor devices. Nevertheless, energy consumption is the principal interest of passive 
devices, such as RFID tags and smart cards. Energy use is directly related to a chip area [54]. A small 
area indicates low energy consumption. CMOS technology also affects performance qualities. Distinct 
technologies and standard-cell libraries generate different outcomes; for instance, the identical 
execution of PRESENT generates 1075GE on 0.18μm, 1169GE on 0.25μm and 1000GE on 0.35μm 
CMOS technology [55]. Table 3 presents the GE and power consumption in relation to CMOS 
technology [46]. Table 4 describes the frequency, energy, RAM and ROM features of different 
microcontrollers in the marketplace [56]. 
Table 3: Characteristics of different CMOS technology. 
CMOS technology 
node (µm) 
Gate density  
(kGEs/mm2) 
Power consumption 
(nW/MHz/GE) 
0.35 6 18 
0.18 125 15 
0.13 206 10 
0.09 404 7 
0.065 800 6.68 
 
Table 4: Features of various microcontroller platforms. 
Microcontroller 
platform 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
RAM 
(KB) 
ROM (KB) Power 
(mA) 
8-bit 4-8 0.064-4 1.4-128 2.2-8 
16-bit 4-8 2-10 48-60 1.5-2 
32-bit 13-180 256-512 4000-32,000 31-100 
 
4. Securing the IoT system 
Section four concisely discusses lightweight algorithms use to secure the Internet of things network 
communication. Furthermore, this chaper classify the latest developed lightweight algorithm.Figure 2 
illustrates a different type of most recent lightweight cryptography which primarily split into two 
categories symmetric and asymmetric algorithm. The symmetric lightweight algorithm further divided 
into Lightweight Block Cipher (LWBC) and Lightweight Stream Ciphers (LWSC). Elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) falls under symmetric cryptography. The factors of the lightweight cryptographic 
primitives are evaluated by the key size, block size, number of rounds, and structures. We will discuss 
the recent development of three cipher technology such as block cipher, stream cipher and elliptic curve 
cipher to secure resource constrained IoT network.  
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4.1 Lightweight Block cipher 
Block cipher is one kind of symmetric ciphers, and a complete block of data is processed at the 
same time. Lightweight block ciphers are used in two distinct styles of networks like Substitution-
permutation network (SPN) and Feistel network (FN). Feistel structure is a design of the same circuit 
for encryption and decryption with minimal overhead. For encryption and decryption procedure, Feistel 
structure uses the same program code, which ensures low memory requirement [57]. The SPN network 
is faster without a key schedule which makes the system vulnerable to attacks. SPN structure is more 
suitable because of lesser execution round requirement and has lower power expenditure [19].  
 
Fig 2: Classification of a recent developed lightweight cryptography algorithm. 
Key size, block size, structure type, and the number of rounds is the primary considerations to 
evaluate a lightweight block cipher. In [58] writers recommend that a lightweight algorithm must focus 
on the three challenges such as a minimal memory, low power intake, sufficient security level. A 
Lightweight algorithm should have a small block size of 32–64 bits in comparison with the conventional 
64 and 128 bits block size [59].  
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4.2 Lightweight Stream cipher 
A stream cipher is another category of lightweight weight symmetric cryptographic algorithm and 
encrypts and decrypts data bit by bit. A stream cipher is simpler and quicker compared to block ciphers. 
This cipher is developed applying linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and nonlinear feedback shift 
registers (NLFSRs) [60]. It is extensively applied in WSN, cell phones etc. [60, 61]. Stream ciphers are 
used for both speed and fewer computation requirements. Some common stream ciphers are RC4, 
Salsa20, Trivium and Chacha.  
4.3 Lightweight Elliptic curve cipher 
Asymmetric ciphers like ECC also use to secure IoT network. ECC ensures authentication and 
confidentiality both [49]. Asymmetric ciphers use larger key size and more memory consumption, 
which make this cipher less popular in IoT security. RSA and ECC are two asymmetric cryptography 
can be used in IoT network security. ECC use lowered key size to show a similar security level 
compared to RSA. El-Gamal and Diffie-Hellman key algorithm can secure IoT system. AES [50] is 
100–1000 times quicker than ECC on 8-bit microcontrollers according to execution time. ECC is the 
popular option to design to provide security in the IoT system.  
5. Recent lightweight cryptography for IoT security 
This section briefly reviews the most current lightweight cryptographic protocols to secure IoT 
network in a resource-restricted system.  
Prakash, Singh, and Khatri [30] developed a new hybrid algorithm called Lightweight hybrid 
cryptography (LWHC) that used a combination of LED and PRESENT Cipher with a compact key 
scheduling algorithm SPECK. This system used RECTANGLE S-Box to make it faster and more 
robust. Encryption is done by the use of LED, PRESENT and RECTANGLE S-Box. However, the 
SPECK algorithm is also used for key scheduling. Proposed system used 64 bit of plain data to encrypt 
and perform an XOR operation with 128 bits schedule key. The LED cipher used the typical key 
algorithm which is not resistive to the key attacks. However, 128 bits SPECK key schedule algorithm 
is used in the proposed system, which gives it lightweight nature and secures from various key attacks. 
This advanced system used 64bit block plain text XOR with 128 bits key that maintains its robustness. 
The proposed algorithm is lightweight and secure to the various key attacks; however, not resistive to 
the other security attack. 
Noura, Couturier, Pham, and Chehab [31] proposed Lightweight stream cipher scheme (LSC) 
which is based on the dynamic key-dependent method to reach high-level security. This system also 
includes a few simple operations to reduce the overhead, and cryptographic primitives change in a 
dynamic, lightweight manner for each input block. Security and performance study confirms that the 
proposed cipher attains a high level of effectiveness and robustness, which make it suitable for resource-
restricted IoT devices. It uses 128, 192, and 256 bits secret key with a nonce. This algorithm is a 
combination of CR4, Pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), and Linear-feedback shift register 
(LFSR) with 12 to 14 rounds. This algorithm shows high periodicity, low energy consumption, low 
computational power and resistive to statistical, Algebraic, and brute-force attacks. However, it is not 
adequate for the disclosure and de-synchronisation attacks. 
Shantha and L. Arockiam [60] designed SAT_Jo system which is based on the substitution-
permutation network with a new lightweight block cipher which is appropriate for tag-based functions 
of the IoT. This system computes a 4 x 4 S-box by 24 order of the Galois field. This design is based on 
the SPN network of a block cipher with DES and PRESENT [62] involves in 31 rounds. Its usages 64 
bits block and 80 bits key size. This system presents an adequate level of security to the resource-
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constrained nodes of tag-based applications. This proposal offers a better balance between performance, 
resource requirements and security for resource constrained IoT systems. These lightweight primitives 
do not support for an extensive range of functions and impose many challenges to the attacker. These 
lightweight algorithms are considered as weak.  
Kubba and Hoomod [63] considered a Hybrid symmetric model based on the PRESENT (Block 
cipher) and Salsa20 (stream cipher) cryptography algorithms. This algorithm also used a 2D logistic 
map of a chaotic system to generate pseudo-random keys which produce more complexity. The main 
aim of this proposed algorithm is to enhance the complexity of the current PRESENT algorithm and 
keep the performance of computational operations as nominal as possible. The proposed algorithm uses 
a 64-bits symmetric block cipher algorithm and a 128-bits length key. Mainly the block PRESENT 
algorithm is considered for fast its performance [64]. Salsa20 has proposed because of its efficiency to 
use with constrained nodes [65]. Therefore, PRESENT and Salsa20 cipher algorithms meet the 
lightweight algorithms speed and complexity requirement. 20 rounds of PRESENT keys algorithms are 
used instead of the 31 rounds keys. However, Salsa20 cipher algorithm is used to generate keystream. 
The suggested algorithm has a significant level of randomness and demonstrates efficient performance 
with rapid execution times. Hence, the executed time of the proposed algorithm is a satisfied lightweight 
algorithm speed. However, the proposed algorithm introduces more complexity while preserving the 
computational speed at a minimum.  
Noura et al. [66] proposed One round cipher (ORC) lightweight algorithm based on a dynamic 
structure with a single round roll. This model generates a dynamic key and then used to develop two 
robust substitution tables, a dynamic permutation table, and two pseudo-random matrices. This dynamic 
cipher structure uses a single round while providing a high level of randomness and security. Proposed 
chipper is resistant to statistical attacks which exhibit high randomness. OCR cipher shows a high level 
of sensitivity which protect it for key-related attacks. 
The Generalised Triangle Based Security Algorithm (G-TBSA) [67] is designed by Ahmed et al., 
which is applied in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) with low power Wi-Fi. G-TBSA is a combination 
of resource-friendly data encryption and an efficient key generation mechanism. The key generation 
process is the heart of the algorithm since its usages fewer resources to generate the keys which 
minimise the complexity and provide energy efficiency. The proposed mechanism used the non-right-
angle triangle-based method, and the output signal is used instead of time calculation. The proposed G-
TBSA is more energy-efficient than other algorithms. However, this method works only for the sensors 
device. 
Modified PRESENT [68] is a new lightweight PRESENT cipher presented Chatterjee and 
Chakraborty which has changed the original PRESENT cipher by reducing encryption round and 
modifying the Key Register. The key register is updated by encrypting its value by adding a delta value 
function of TEA (Tiny encryption algorithm), which is another lightweight cipher. The additional layer 
helps to reduce the PRESENT round from 31 to 25, which is the minimum round required for security. 
The efficiency of the proposed algorithm is increased by encrypting the key register. The proposed 
algorithm proves its superiority by analysing different software parameter analysis like N-gram, Non-
Homogeneity, Frequency Distribution graph and Histogram. This algorithm shows better performance 
in terms of gate value. However, this algorithm has not tested for battery consumption. 
Key-Dependent and Flexible (KDF) [69] proposal supports the logic and delivers a new lightweight 
cipher, with a simple round event and a dynamic key for every message. Subsequently, the proposed 
cipher utilised for real-time Multimedia applications with limited resources. This algorithm generates 
dynamic cryptographic primitives and performs the mixing of selected blocks in a dynamic pseudo-
random manner. Accordingly, different plain-text messages are encrypted differently, and the avalanche 
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effect is also preserved. This proposal shows the high level of immunity to the attacks such as statistical, 
differential and brute-force attacks. KDF need less computational complexity (less delay) than AES. 
Roy,Rawat, and Karjee [12] proposed Lightweight CA (LCC), a lightweight cellular automaton 
(CA)-based cipher. This method encrypts information at the perception layer, which shows more 
efficient than some of the existing ciphers like DES, 3DES. This algorithm passes the randomness tests 
according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Besides, it passes all the 
DIEHARD tests which show the strong security feature of LCC. Modified QARMA [59] proposed by 
Zhao, Yan, and Li a part-iterative architecture for QARMA, which integrates encryption and decryption 
operations. Systems use on ASIC in CMOS 55 nm technology, where a maximum frequency of 
666.67MHz is achieved. The results show that this model has achieved 54% area reduced and 
concurrently 25 times max frequency enhanced, and the throughput increases by 1.56times contrasted 
with the unrolled implementation. However, further modification needed to optimise the resource 
intake. 
Chaudhary and K. Chatterjee [70] designed Modified Block Cipher Technique (MBCT) which is a 
combination of one Matrix Rotation, XoR and Expansion function. The encryption process primarily 
changes in Expansion and Round key creation function. The key length is 256 bits, and 256 bits block 
plain text used in this process. There is 32 rounds use in this algorithm. This algorithm needs less 
encryption and decryption time to compare to AES, DES and SIMON. Modified MBCT is also used 
less memory than AES, DES and SIMON. 
Thangamani and Murugappan [44] proposes lightweight cryptography primitives by combining the 
differential logical pattern (DLP), S-box pattern generation and random key generation which decrease 
the time and memory complexity by decreasing the number of pattern structure elements. It uses 16 x 
16 blocks of the input message. This LWC technique provides higher complexity to the scheme, which 
makes difficult for a hacker to capture the information. DLP uses less memory and time. S-box, the 
random key and input text or image generate the patterns. The DLP method is applied to encrypt the 
input blocks prior to transmit the message. The receiver generates the key for decryption by inversing 
the random key and S-box. Then, the DLP decryption technique is used to rebuild the initial information. 
The benefits of this work are reduced memory consumption and time complexity.  
Hamzaab et al. developed Chaos-based PRNG [71] encryption cryptography to maintain patients’ 
data confidentiality. This algorithm is used to keyframes immediately after extracting them using a 
video summarisation technique from video information. Symmetric block encryption system operates 
the proposed chaos-based algorithm with one set of confusion and diffusion processes. It uses a new 
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) based on Zaslavsky chaotic and 2D logistic map. 
Probabilistic performance makes this system more appropriate for real-time. This method is effective 
to resist various attacks such as the differential, statistical, and exhaustive attacks to find the secret keys. 
This technique is fast and safer than another current algorithm. 
Gyamf, Ansere, and Xu [72] proposed an algorithm by improving ECC which is containing a 
lightweight ECC based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique and Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES). Two sets public and private keys are generated from ECC Standard curves constructed 
on the key size of 256-bits and 512bits. Key K, generated by the cloud server, use to encryption and 
decryption applying AES with 10 different sets of data. Sensor information is encrypted at the IoT 
devices with a low key before it transmitted to the upper layer, which confirms primary security as 
internet service is used. The IoT-Edge obtains the generated Public Keys from the remote server, then 
extract and updates the different IoT devices. It ensures the highest security level as performs the higher 
standard of encryption and decryption. This proposed Modified ECC (MECC) has decreased the 
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complexity of the conventional algorithms and considerably decreased the run time for heavy 
encryption. Due to this reason, this solution suitable for resource constraint IoT nodes.  
Khan et al. proposed IECC [73] as a secure framework for authentication and encryption in IoT-
based medical sensor information. The IECC is a curve based system that has a specific base point 
derived from functions of a prime number. This system mixes of biometric parameters and user 
credentials. An additional secret key is created to improve network security compared to typical ECC. 
A public key is generated to encrypt the information, and a private key is used to decrypt the data. The 
secret key is generated from the private key, public key and elliptic curve point. The system possesses 
security requirements like low encryption, decryption time and communication overhead. The mean 
encryption and decryption time of IECC is 1.032 and 1.004 µs correspondingly. This value is less than 
the ECC and RSA value. Statistical analysis also shows the strength of this scheme. 
Mohandas et al. [74] introduced A4 stream cipher uses a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 
and a Feedback with Carry Shift Register (FCSR). A4 shows higher security and easy to implement in 
different applications to secure data communication. A seed box containing 256 hexadecimal numbers 
each of 128 bits is established at both ends sender and receiver. After receiving the seed value, the 
LFER primarily clocks to set a number of times. This clocking of LFSR makes sure the second level 
security as an intruder is completely unaware of this calculation, and it secures the system. A4 is entirely 
protected to algebraic attacks due to the arrangement of LFSR and FCSR. This algorithm also shows 
resistive to brute force and differentials attacks. 
New lightweight stream cipher (NLSC) [75] on Chaos stream cipher algorithm is a combination of 
a chaotic system and two Nonlinear Feedback Shift Registers (NFSRs) designed by Ding et al.  80 bits 
secret key has used in this algorithm. This algorithm is a combination of Logistic chaotic system, two 
40-level NFSRs, and three multiplexers. The test results show that the stream cipher here has good 
cryptographic characteristics and resists statistical attacks. This algorithm is also suitable for resource-
constrained devices. 
6. Discussion and limitation of existing lightweight cryptography 
Recently developed cryptography can split into two sections like symmetric and asymmetric. 
Symmetric ciphers use reduced key length compared to the asymmetric algorithm; thus, they are 
vulnerable to security because of less complexity nature. However, asymmetric ciphers use more 
complexity to secure the IoT network communication, but the larger key length makes them slower. 
Studying all these crucial considerations, it is a necessity to improve an algorithm which will use less 
power, decrease the complexity, take less time, deliver first and adequate security to the low-end IoT 
devices [76]. Block cipher and stream cipher represent to a symmetric algorithm whereas ECC 
represents the asymmetric cipher. 
Table 5 shows a comparative analysis of some of the most recent (2019-2020) proposed protocols. 
These protocols have been briefly reviewed in this paper. LWHC, SAT_Jo, Modified PRESENT, LCC, 
Modified QARMA, DLP and MBCT are block cipher algorithm which is suitable for resource 
constrained device in an IoT environment. Modified PRESENT and LWHC both used 25 rounds of the 
algorithm; thus, they need less computational power. However, they are protective of key attacks but 
vulnerable to other attacks. On the other hand, MBCT applied 256 bits of key and 32 rounds of 
algorithm which require low memory but need to verify differential and linear cryptoanalysis attacks. 
Modified ECC and IECC are suitable for resource-constrained devices. However, IECC only applies 
for authentication purpose. One round ORC is a stream cipher algorithm which is resistive to statistical 
analysis, but latency is comparatively high. Hybrid symmetric with PRESENT and Salsa20 need less 
computational power. Nevertheless, more time is required to calculate (computational time) the 
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algorithm. G-TBSA require low energy consumption but is suitable for wireless sensor networks only. 
LSC and KDF are suitable for stream cipher and use less computational and less power to generate the 
algorithm, but they showed less resistive to disclosure and de-synchronisation. 
 
Table 5. A comparative analysis of the most recent Existing protocols 
Proposed 
Work 
Algorithm, Tools 
and Techniques. 
Key Size, Block 
size and round 
Cipher and 
network Type 
Features 
LSC 
(2019) 
CR4, PRNG, 
Dynamic key, 
XorShift64, LFSR, 
XOR. 
Secret keys 128, 
192, 256 
nonce and 
dynamic key 512 
bits, 12 to 14 
rounds 
Stream High periodicity. 
Low energy and 
computational power needed. 
Resistive to statistical, 
Algebraic, and brute-force 
attacks. 
Hybrid 
Symmetric 
(2019) 
PRESENT and 
Salsa20, XOR, 
Chaotic system, 
Pseudo-random keys 
64 bits block, 128 
bits key 
Block Work efficiently with fast 
executed time. 
The less computational power 
needed. 
LWHC 
(2019) 
LED, PRESENT 
RECTANGLE S-Box, 
XOR, SPECK key 
generation. 
64 bits block, 128 
keys 
Block Robust to key attacks. 
ORC 
(2019) 
KSA, RC4, SHA-512. One round SPN, FN Resistive to statistical 
analysis, visual degradation, 
sensitivity test. 
SAT_Jo 
(2019) 
PRESENT, DES, S-
Box 
64 bits block, 80-
bit key, 31 rounds 
Block cipher, 
SPN 
This algorithm offers a better 
balance between performance, 
resource requirements and 
security for resource 
constrained IoT systems. 
G-TBSA 
 (2020) 
TBSA, Non-right-
angle triangle. 
 WSN Low energy consumption. 
Suitable for wireless sensor 
networks. 
 
Modified 
PRESENT 
(2020) 
PRESENT, TEA, S-
Box, P-Layer. 
64 bits plain text, 
80 bits key, 25 
rounds. 
SPN, FN This algorithm shows better 
performance in terms of gate 
value. 
KDF 
(2019) 
Dynamic key 
generation, SHA-512 
64 bits Key,   Effect of error propagation is 
limited to the byte. 
LCC 
(2019) 
CA, PRN (pseudo 
random number), 
RV512, GCA, non-
linier. 
 Block chipper 
 
Resistive to brute-force, linear 
cryptanalysis, differential 
cryptanalysis attack.  
Modified 
QARMA 
(2020) 
QARMA, ASIC, 
CMOS 55 nm, S- 
Box, Boolean, 
Permutation, 
MixColumms. 
64 blocks, 27 
rounds. 
Block cipher, 
SPN 
This algorithm reduced 54% 
of the area and simultaneously 
max frequency increases by 
25x. 
MBCT 
(2020) 
Matrix location, 
XOR, Expansion 
function. 
256 bits Key. 256 
block plain text. 
32 rounds. 
Block Cipher Less encryption and 
decryption time required 
compared to AES, DES, and 
SIMON. 
Chaos-
based 
PRNG 
(2019) 
PRING, Confusion 
and diffusion 
operation. 2-D chaotic 
system. 
 Block Cipher, 
Symmetric 
Resistive to various attacks 
like differential, statistical, 
and exhaustive attacks for 
finding secret keys. 
MECC 
(2019) 
ECC, AES, Diffie-
Hellman 
256 bits and 512 
bits 
Asymmetric, 
ECC 
It reduced the complexity of 
the conventional algorithms 
which make it suitable for 
resource constraint IoT nodes. 
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IECC 
(2020) 
ECC, SHA-512, 
XOR, Secret key. 
512 bits ECC Statistical analysis shows the 
strength of this scheme. 
A4 (2020) LFSR, FCSR, XOR, 
Boolean. 
126 bits Key Steam cipher A4 is entirely protected to 
algebraic attacks and shows 
resistive to brute force and 
differentials attacks. 
LLSC 
(2019) 
NFSR 80 bits key Steam cipher This algorithm resists to 
statistical attacks.  
 
DLP 
(2019) 
S-Box, Random Key  Block Cipher Reduce memory consumption. 
Reduce time complexity. 
 
Table 6 illustrates a comparison between various lightweight ciphers which influence the selection 
of ciphers for resource-restricted devices. Block size, key size, gate area, latency and throughput are the 
main parameter for lightweight primitives. Lightweight cryptography primitives performance is 
calculated by several matrices like ley size, rounds, latency, throughput and gate area etc.  
Table 6: Comparison of the different lightweight algorithm in terms of key length, block size, 
technology value, GE, latency, throughput, and number of rounds. 
Algorithm Key size 
(bits) 
Block 
size 
(bits) 
Gate 
Area 
(GE) 
Technology 
value (µm) 
No. of 
round 
Latency 
(Cycle) 
Throughput 
(Mbps) 
AES 128/192/256 128 2400 0.13 10/12/14 226 56.64 
PRESENT 80, 128 64 2195 0.13 31 31 206 
HIGHT 128 64 3048 0.13 32 34 188 
KTANTAN 80 64 688 0.13 12/16/20 255 25.1 
LED 128 64 1265 0.13 32 48 133.33 
RECTANGLE 128 64 1787 0.13 25 26 246 
PRINCE 128 64 3491 0.13 12 12 533 
SIMON 96 48 763 0.13 32/52/72 304 15.8 
Piccolo 80 64 1260 0.13 25 237.04 237 
SFN 96 64 1876 0.18 32 1876.04 200 
SAT_Jo 80 64 1167 0.13 31 1270 14.9 
Modified 
PRESENT 
80 64 1884 0.13 25   
QARMA 64 64 17109 0.13 27 1 1705 
Modified 
QARMA 
64 64 7844 0.13 27 27 2667 
 
Key size: Key length or key size indicates the number of bits in a key which used in cryptographic 
cipher techniques. The encryption strength depends on the complexity to discover the key. Encryption 
intensity is defined by the key size used in the encryption process. Longer keys deliver more robust 
cipher on the other hand; it requires more power and complexity requirement. AES, LED, 
RECTANGLE and PRINCE use 128 bit of key which make them unsuitable for resource-restricted 
devices. Nevertheless, Modified QARMA algorithm applies only 64 bits key size for encryption 
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purpose. Besides, SAT_Jo, Modified PRESENT, Piccolo and KTANTAN are suitable for the IoT 
devices as they use 80 bits of key size. More power consumption test needs to be done for the modified 
PRESENT cipher. 
Block size: Block cipher operates on a constant length of bits sequence. Block cipher cryptography 
uses the same size of input and output block. Bigger the block size requires more CPU and battery 
needed to secure the IoT network. Hence, a smaller block size algorithm is suitable for the IoT end 
devices. According to the compared algorithm table, AES uses the largest block size which is 128 bits 
(16 bytes) to secure the network and SIMON applies the lowest 46 bits of a block. However, most of 
the block cipher consume 64 bits (8 bytes) block range.  
Gate area and technology value: Lightweight cryptography is measured by the Gate Equivalent 
(GE). Gate Equivalent indicates the physical area essential to execute the algorithm. A suitable 
lightweight primitive requires less gate area. According to the ISO/IEC standardised [77] lightweight 
cryptographic cryptography should have the GE value from 1000 to 2000. Table 6 indicates 
KATANTAN, LED, RECTANGLE, SIMON, Piccolo, SFN, SAT-Jo and Modified PRESENT are the 
lightweight algorithm. In the IoT environment, power consumption is a critical consideration. Energy 
can be assessed on Gate value (GE) and subsequent CMOS technology value [78]. When CMOS 
technology shifts form µm to nanometre (nm) gate intensity rises. Table 6 represents the corresponding 
technology value of 0.13 µm. 
Number of rounds: A part of the key size, ciphers use round-based execution which makes the 
cipher extra secure. Larger key and more rounds transform the system safer [79] and use more energy 
and computational power. Cryptographic designing requires to decrease the necessary iterations round 
number. As a result, this will diminish the necessary resources and latency, which are both necessary 
to preserve the major functionality of IoT nodes [66]. The current typical ciphers are not fitted to these 
IoT nodes because a greater number of round repetitions is essential to achieve the preferred security 
[31]. AES, KTANTAN and PRINCE require less round, but gate area is higher than the lightweight 
algorithm. SFN and Sat_Jo are the lightweight algorithms though they use more round than AES. 
Piccolo is the suitable lightweight in terms of key length, round, gate area and throughput. 
Latency: Latency is calculated as the time needed between the initial approach of encryption, and 
encrypted output is generated [80]. Latency represents the number of cycles. Latency is critical for real-
time applications like smart city, smart transport, and smart grid etc. The IoT devices are resource 
restricted heterogeneous devices with high latency, low energy, minimal computation capability, and 
low throughput [12]; therefore, the minimum achievable latency is required. Low computational 
complexity is an essential prerequisite for an effective cipher system to ensure low latency which leads 
to low power and resources overhead [66]. Consequently, it is necessary to design new cryptographic 
algorithms with low latency and resources consumption. PRINCE, QARMA, and modified QARMA 
have the lowest latency, which indicates they are suitable for resource constrained devices. However, 
according to the author [58], further modification is needed for QARMA algorithm. AFN, SAT_Jo, 
AES and Piccolo are some of the block ciphers with higher latency that makes them vulnerable to 
several IoT attacks. KTANTAN and Piccolo show more latency which makes these algorithms 
inapplicable for the Internet of things devices. 
Throughput: Throughput measures how much data is transferred from a source at a unit time. 
Throughput is higher in traditional cryptography; in contrast, several IoT applications expect moderate 
throughput [57]. SAT_Jo cipher facilitates high throughput and low latency. Besides, this algorithm 
needs less energy, and less area compares PRESENT block cipher, which makes it suitable for the 
lightweight block cipher [61]. However, LED, SIMON, SFN, and SAT-Jo use more algorithm, which 
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makes them expensive in terms of computational power. Most of the algorithms show vulnerability to 
the various attacks. 
The trade-off between performance, cost, and security in the resource constrained environment 
draw in figure 3. Kong [79] quoted a significant link between the cost, performance, and security of the 
IoT devices. The system speed is dynamically affected by the process platform. Compared to serial 
architecture, parallel arrangement enhances performance and decreases latency. Consequently, parallel 
structure and lower number of cryptographic rounds increase performance. Moreover, the system cost 
is directly associated with the selections of algorithms and performance. More cost is necessary for 
more robust and faster cipher [57].  
 
Fig 3: Trade-off between cost, performance, and security. 
System performance is primarily computed by the number of rounds that a cipher can execute. More 
rounds involve more computational requirement; hence latency increases [79]. Conventional block 
cipher like AES uses a multi-round composition with several round repetitions which can be based on 
Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) or Feistel Networks (FN) [66]. Feistel network has a 
comparative advance than SP network considering the encryption and decryption activities. SPN 
consumes more resource than the Feistel network structure.  However, the security of SPN is 
comparatively higher because the round function can modify all block messages in a reiterative round 
[81]. 
 The key length is directly related to the security of lightweight cryptographic network 
communication. The larger the key more secure the network; however, larger keys require more 
memory and CPU. Consequently, makes the cipher unsuitable for resource-restricted devices. Table 
showing the largest key 256 bits and the lowest is 64 bits. QARMA uses the smallest key size, which 
makes them lightweight algorithm although their gate area is higher than the standard lightweight 
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cipher. On the other hand, SIMON and KTANTAN gate are is in ultralow lightweight range and latency 
of KTANTAN is higher than the other. 
Many new lightweight cipher algorithms have been proposed; nevertheless, the scope is there to 
improve in the area of security enhancement, decreasing latency, reducing energy consumption, 
lowering power consumption and chip area reduction. Different types of cipher are facing various 
challenges such as LCC shows resistance to various attacks, but key management strategies have not 
been developed yet. In contrast, G-TBSA consumes low energy, and this is suitable for wireless sensor 
network only. None of the modern lightweight algorithms is secure enough for both block cipher and 
stream cipher. Following are the various issues that need to address to develop lightweight block and 
stream cipher algorithm. 
Challenges in lightweight block cipher: 
• Implement a shorter key length. 
• Generate simpler and fewer rounds of an algorithm. 
• Use more frequent dynamic key. 
• Apply smaller block of data. 
• Develop a simple key structure   
Issues in lightweight stream cipher: 
• Apply smaller key size. 
• Decrease the internal state. 
• Reduce the chip area. 
7. Conclusion 
We have analysed recent research on lightweight cryptographic techniques used in IoT network to 
secure data communication. Each algorithm has some merits and demerits to ensure security while 
exchanging information in the IoT environment. Some algorithms demanded more storage space but 
fewer computations requirement and vice versa. Several algorithms are lightweight in terms of energy, 
computational power, and cost; nevertheless, they do not demonstrate resistance to different attacks.  
We found two types of algorithms according to the key arrangement such as symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography. Popular recent symmetric algorithms used in Internet of things security are block cipher 
and stream cipher; however, none of them is ideal for securing resource constrained communication in 
IoT system. The security problem is a critical issue of IoT, which has not been appropriately addressed, 
and it is a crucial research topic in IoT network protection. A lightweight cryptographic algorithm needs 
to be developed to secure resource constrained IoT architecture. Growing attacks pattern to the IoT 
networks demands research on lightweight ciphers improvement. Future research can focus on reducing 
key size, using a more frequent dynamic key, decreasing block size, introducing more straightforward 
rounds, designing simple key schedules for lightweight block cipher development. Internal state, 
minimising key size, and initialising vector are some of the prime objectives to develop the lightweight 
stream ciphers. 
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